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Abstract. The challenge of model checking of isolated software com-
ponents becomes more and more relevant with the boom of component-
oriented technologies [20]. An important issue here is how to verify an
open model representing an isolated software component (also referred
as the missing environment problem in [17]).
In this paper, we propose on-the-fly simulation of the component envi-
ronment to address the issue. We employ behavior protocols [18] and
a system coordinating two model checkers: Java PathFinder [4] and
BPChecker [15]. This approach allows us to enclose the model represent-
ing the behavior of a given component and consequently to exhaustively
verify the model. Our solution was implemented as the Carmen tool [1].
We demonstrate scalability of our approach on real-life examples and
show that, in comparison with the COMBAT model checker [17], we
bring better performance, and also exhaustive and correct verification.
1 Introduction
Model checking [9], as one of the most popular approaches to formal verifica-
tion of software systems, has already proven to be useful. However, the need
for extracting a finite model from a target system (the ”classical” model check-
ing) forces researchers to seek approaches on model checking at the source-code
level. Despite the complexities of these approaches, particularly the state ex-
plosion problem, there exist such model checkers (e.g. Java PathFinder [4] or
Bandera [10]). One of the methods of coping with the issue of state explosion is
decomposition of a system into small parts which can be verified separately.
Independently on this branch of research, widely popular Component-Oriented
Programming [20] introduces software components – small compact units pro-
viding a certain functionality through strictly defined points. It is therefore nat-
ural to tackle the problem of software component verification, since components
themselves bring the most straightforward way of decomposition – a property
so intensively sought when fighting the state explosion problem.
2
In the scope of formal verification, we distinguish between closed and open
systems. A closed system is autonomous, i.e. it does not communicate with
another system. In the context of component programming, it is e.g. whole com-
ponent application — there are no interfaces for the communication of the whole
application with another component. On the other hand, an open system com-
municates with other entities; again, in the context of component programming,
it is e.g. a single component, that communicates with other components (its en-
vironment) via interfaces. A behavior model of a closed system is called a closed
model, while a behavior model of an open system is called an open model.
From the verification point of view, a behavior model specified by the code of
a single component (an open model) is incomplete, as the behavior of the com-
ponent depends not only on the decisions made by the component itself, but also
on its environment. In the context of different environments, the behavior of the
component can differ. However, the source-code level model checkers typically
need a closed model as the input. Therefore, an important question arises here:
How to enclose the model of a component and thus to allow formal verification?
The challenge is also referred as the missing environment problem [17].
The goal of our research is to propose an answer to the question above. In
this paper we design a method of on-the-fly simulation of software component’s
environment to achieve a closed model. In our solution, component’s implemen-
tation and its behavior specification, given in a form of a behavior protocol
[18], are processed by two cooperating model checkers - Java PathFinder [4]
and BPChecker [15]. These cooperating tools then formally verify component’s
implementation against a behavior protocol and specified properties.
Our solution was implemented as the Carmen tool [1]. We compared Carmen
with COMBAT — the tool presented in [17], addressing the same issue. We
concluded that Carmen performs exhaustive verification, while COMBAT does
not. Also, the state space traversed by Carmen is smaller, which is important
for performance.
To reflect the goal, the structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 intro-
duces basic insights into Java PathFinder, Component-Oriented Programming,
and Behavior Protocols. At the end of the section, we elaborate on the goal of
our research. While Section 3 presents possible approaches to the missing en-
vironment problem, Section 4 describes in detail the concept we have chosen
to implement. Section 5 demonstrates our contributions and scalability of the
solution on real-life examples. In Section 6 we discuss related work. Section 7
concludes the paper.
2 Background
2.1 Java PathFinder
Java PathFinder (JPF) [4,21] is an explicit state software model checker. It
verifies given program by traversing its state space and searching for implemen-
tation errors (e.g. deadlocks, unhandled exceptions,...) and property violations.
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Moreover, user’s own properties can be defined. JPF operates at the program
byte-code level which means that a real-life application written in Java is used
as a model of a system. A custom Java virtual machine (JPF VM) is used to
execute a given program in every possible execution path. The state space of a
target program is a directed acyclic graph in principle with branches determined
by Java bytecode instructions, thread interleavings, and possible values of in-
put data. JPF fights the state-space explosion problem by implementing POR
algorithm [9] and state matching heuristics [12].
2.2 Component-Oriented Programming
We employ the basic idea of Component-Oriented Programming [20] that is
further extended in the hierarchical component models, e.g. [3,5]. Here, compo-
nents are either composite (created as a composition of lower-level components)
or primitive (implemented directly in a common programming language, e.g.
Java). Components are viewed as black-box entities. Interfaces of components
can be either required or provided. Through provided interfaces, services of the
component are accessible, the required interfaces are connected to other compo-
nents to intermediate delegation of tasks. By the term environment we denote
all the components connected to the interfaces of a given component.
We implemented the Carmen tool, introduced in this paper, for the Fractal
component model [3]. As a future work, we also plan to adapt Carmen for the
SOFA component model [5]. We chose Fractal and SOFA because we had been
experienced with the formal verification of the applications written in those
component models and because checkers of behavior protocols had been already
implemented for both of them [6,15].
2.3 Behavior Protocols
Behavior protocols [18] are a language for component behavior specification.
They have been successfully applied to the SOFA [18] and Fractal [6,15] compo-
nent models. To analyze behavior of components specified via behavior protocols,
Behavior Protocol Checker (BPChecker) [15] was developed.
A behavior protocol describes communication of a component with its envi-
ronment. 4 On the semantic level, such a communication is defined as the set of
all admissible sequences of events on the component’s interfaces. There are two
kinds of events: requests for method calls and responses to those requests.
Syntactically, behavior protocols are similar to process algebra [7]. The basic
building blocks of a behavior protocol are event tokens, denoting the events. An
4 To be precise, a behavior protocol can describe not only the communication of a
component with its environment, but also the interplay of events inside a composite
component. However, this alternative usage of behavior protocols is out of scope of
this paper, as our goal is to check consistency of a primitive component code with
the protocol of the component; specification of a composite component behavior via
behavior protocols is not needed here. For more details, see [18].
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event token has the following syntax: <prefix><interface>.<method><suffix>.
The prefix ? denotes acceptance of an event, the prefix ! denotes emission of an
event. The suffix ↑ denotes a request (i.e. a method call), and the suffix ↓ denotes
a response (i.e. return from a method). Therefore, for i being an interface name
and m being a method name on i, ?i.m↑ stands for accepting the request for a
call of i.m, while !i.m↓ denotes the emission of the response for a call of i.m.
Behavior protocols are syntactically constructed from the event tokens using
operators. There are operators for sequencing (;), alternative behavior (+), repe-
tition (*), and arbitrary interleaving (|), that is useful for behavior specification
of parallel processes.
Also, abbreviations are defined for behavior protocols; they serve as syntactic
sugar, standing for complex but often used constructs. The abbreviation ?i.m
stands for ?i.m↑ ; !i.m↓, i.e. acceptance of a request followed by the emission
of the associated response (i.e. the typical part of the behavior of a component
providing i.m to the outside world). Similarly, !i.m stands for !i.m↑ ; ?i.m↓.
Finally, if P is an arbitrary protocol, ?i.m{P} stands for ?i.m↑ ; P ; !i.m↓,
i.e. it describes a part of the behavior of a component providing i.m, where the
protocol P describes what the component does inside of the implementation of
i.m.
NULL stands for an empty protocol (specifying no behavior).
We demonstrate the usage of behavior protocols on a simple example shown
in Fig. 1. Here, the functionality of the Database component is expressed by its
behavior protocol. First, Database accepts the initialization call — db.start;
this leads to calling lg.log and then the result of the db.start call is returned.
After that, Database is able to absorb an arbitrary number of db.get or db.put
calls, each resulting in an lg.log call. To finish the execution, the component
is stopped by calling db.stop.
Fig. 1. Motivation Example: the LogDatabase composite component consisting
of the Database and Logger subcomponents. The small black and gray boxes de-
note provided and required interfaces. E.g., db is a provided interface of Database,
while lg is a required interface of Database. The behavior protocol of Database
is shown.
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2.4 Goal Revisited
Behavior protocols give to a component application developer the option to check
consistency of his or her design from the point of view of component behavior.
For example, if behavior protocols of all three components in Fig. 1 are provided
by the developer, it is possible to check correctness of communication between
Database and Logger, as well as compliance of the LogDatabase internals behav-
ior (determined by the protocols of Database and Logger) with the LogDatabase
protocol itself [18]. However, once we take also primitive components into con-
sideration (i.e. the components that are not composed of subcomponents, but
directly implemented in some programing language instead — and there must
be such components in each application), things get more complicated.
Let as assume that Database is primitive (and is implemented in Java). Now,
we cannot assure the correctness of the Database implementation by pure behav-
ior protocol analysis, as there are no behavior protocols describing the behavior
of Database internals.
Moreover, we can look at the problem from another point of view: we want to
use verification tools for Java code. One of the options to specify the properties
to verify is to use assertions — conditions that must by true when the control
reaches given places in the code5. However, as the code of the component is
an open code (it has no predefined entry point and the behavior of the code
depends on how the environment will use it), it is not possible to use the code
verification tool to check the properties expressed as assertions. As mentioned
in the introduction, this issue is called missing environment problem [17].
Therefore, the goal of our work is the following: to design and implement
a tool that (1) checks the compliance of Java implementation of a primitive
component with the behavior protocol of the component (i.e. verifies that the
code does what the protocol specifies), and (2) at the same time it checks validity
of the assertions in the Java code; only those runs that correspond to the behavior
specified via the protocol are taken into consideration.
We chose Java as both the SOFA and Fractal component models (where
the behavior protocols were already applied) use Java as the implementation
language.
3 Cooperation of Model Checkers
The problem we tackle in this paper is a verification problem. To solve it, we
decided rather than developing a brand new tool to adapt an existing model
checker. From our study, the Java Path-Finder tool (JPF) emerged as the best
option. It provides wide functionality and can be easily modified and extended.
However, JPF itself does not allow to cope with all the issues of a single com-
ponent verification. Since JPF allows to verify only closed models, we introduce
5 Contrary to the classic assertions used for software testing, assertions in formal
verification are much more powerful tool, as the verification tool checks the validity
of assertions for all possible runs.
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behavior protocols to substitute the environment of the component and thus to
enclose the model. During the verification it is then necessary to observe the
communication of the component with the environment represented by behavior
protocols. To do this, we employ an additional model checking tool – BPChecker.
The specific details of such a checker cooperation form our main contribution.
The task of the cooperation is to synchronize the verification of the com-
ponent implementation, performed by JPF, and the verification of component
external behavior, performed by BPChecker, whenever a communication be-
tween the component and its environment occurs. Such a synchronization can
be achieved using two different concepts discussed further: Virtual Environment
or Environment Simulation.
Fig. 2. JPF and BPChecker Cooperation, Proposed Concepts
3.1 Virtual Environment Concept
The key idea of this concept, presented in Fig. 2 A), is to automatically generate
virtual environment of a component (i.e. a Java code), creating a closed system
that can be verified by JPF. Such a code has to provide an entry point (the
main method). Moreover, the virtual environment has to be able to perform
every sequence of events described in the component’s behavior protocol. This
guarantees that JPF will be able to analyze all the behavior alternatives that
are relevant.
While verification of such an enclosed model (code of the component + vir-
tual environment) is simple (this can be done with just a minor modification of
JPF [17]), generating a virtual environment from the protocol has many issues.
The reason is that some forms of behavior protocols (e.g. those specified using
the alternative and repetition operators) can not be equivalently expressed by a
Java code. Therefore, no virtual environment can correspond to such protocols,
and consequently the verification process cannot be correct. Despite its disad-
vantages, this concept was implemented in the COMBAT model checking tool
[17].
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3.2 Environment Simulation Concept
The idea of the Environment Simulation concept is to use JPF to analyze only
the code of the verified component itself and to handle the events on the external
interfaces of the component via a modification of JPF — see Fig. 2 B). Every
time the Manager detects communication initiated by the verified component,
it interrupts the verification process and let the Response Generator simulate
appropriate environment responses according to the behavior protocol of the ver-
ified component. The information about the appropriate environment responses
is taken from the Protocol Checker, that is run in a special mode. At the same
time, Call Generator is used to simulate the calls initiated by the environment.
Finally, the Protocol Checker is used not only to obtain the information about
the environment responses, but also to check that the events emitted by the
verified component respect the protocol.
The Environment Simulation concept allows to simulate any form of behavior
protocols, including the alternative and repetition operators, providing correct
and exhaustive form of verification. Moreover, as Manager can interrupt the
verification process at any time and force JPF to explore another execution
path, it is possible to control verification and to smoothly integrate additional
heuristics.
In the light of the outlined options, the Environment Simulation concept
was chosen to implement. Based on this decision, the Carmen project [1] was
founded. More extensive description of the project can be found also in [19].
4 Environment Simulation
Based on the discussion above, we propose to develop a Software Component
Model Checker, which implements the Environment Simulation concept. To fa-
cilitate the verification, we have to simulate a component environment by gen-
erating events that will be absorbed by the component. The component is then
forced by JPF to respond to these artificially created events, its behavior is
evaluated and thus the component is being verified.
4.1 Cooperation
Since each tool operates at a different level of abstraction - JPF with byte-code
instructions and BPChecker with events, we need to define a proper mapping
between their state spaces to achieve cooperation. This would be possible if states
that represent absorbed events could be identified. Whereas this is inherently
satisfied inside the BPChecker state space, the JPF state space represents only
the component itself. To tackle this problem, we have extended the JPF state
space with states that represent communication between the component and its
environment. Therefore we are able to find a mapping between state spaces of
the checkers. See Fig. 3 for an illustration example.
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Fig. 3. State Space Mapping
4.2 Environment Simulation
The environment simulation process generates events that occur on interfaces of
the component. These events have to be then inserted into the JPF, afterwards
the verification can continue. We are able to determine which event has to be
inserted in cooperation with BPChecker. Consequently, state space extensions
allow to simulate an absorbed event by creating a new state and by inserting it
into the JPF. Verification then continues from a newly inserted state and thus,
the component is forced to react to the new event.
Moreover, by employing the backtracking strategy we are able to simulate
every possible sequence of events. The component is therefore verified against
every behavior of its environment that is in conformance with a behavior protocol
of this component.
An absorbed event is however representing also a data which are being trans-
formed from an environment to the component and these data have to be gen-
erated as well. We refer to this in Section 5.2.
4.3 Verification
The central unit of the verification process is Manager. It communicates with
both the checkers, arbitrates the cooperation between JPF and BPChecker and
determines future steps of the verification. Manager evaluates states of the check-
ers and decides which events will be simulated on interfaces of the component.
Figuratively speaking, JPF represents the component, BPChecker represents its
environment and Manager provides a connecting layer between them.
To better illustrate the role of Manager, we introduce code snippets of meth-
ods which are used by Manager to control the progress of the verification. The
method stateAdvanced() listed in Fig. 4 handles a situation when JPF ad-
vanced a new state. First, Manager verifies if there was any emitted event and
whether it was in compliance with a given behavior protocol (line 2-3). Con-
sequently, Manager tries to simulate a next event, if BPChecker proposes any
event, it is simulated, both tools are notified and we proceed to a new state (lines
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void stateAdvanced ( ) {
2 i f eventEmitted ( )
BPChecker . ve r i fyEvent ( emittedEvent ) ;
4 newEvent = BPChecker . getEvent ( ) ;
i f newEvent != null
6 JPF . s imulateEvent ( newEvent ) ;
BPChecker . eventSimulated ( newEvent ) ;
8 stateAdvanced ( ) ;
else
10 i f JPF . isEndofExecutionPath ( ) && BPChecker . i sNotAccept ing ( )
reportErrorBehav ior ( ) ;
12 }
14 void s tateBacktracked ( ) {
i f isEventToBacktrack ( )
16 BPChecker . backtrackEvent ( event ) ;
newEvent = BPChecker . getEvent ( ) ;
18 i f newEvent != null
JPF . s imulateEvent ( newEvent ) ;
20 BPChecker . eventSimulated ( newEvent ) ;
stateAdvanced ( ) ;
22 }
Fig. 4. Manager Arbitrating an Advanced/Backtracked State
5-8). If there is no event to simulate, Manager only verifies that both tools are
in accepting states in case the end of an execution path was reached.
The method stateBacktracked(), listed in Fig. 4 (line 15), handles situa-
tions when JPF backtracked from an already explored state. The task of Manager
is to backtrack also a simulated event and then to simulate a new one (lines 20-
22). If there is no event to simulate, nothing is to be done since all paths starting
by events were already explored.
Thanks to these notification methods Manager is able to coordinate coop-
eration of both checkers and thus to achieve an exhaustive verification of all
execution paths of the component implementation.
4.4 Motivation Example Revisited
In this section we revisit the motivation example from Section 2.3 to demonstrate
the verification process. The Fig. 5 shows the implementation of the Database
component together with its behavior protocol. The arrows are showing the
correspondences between events of the behavior protocol and method calls inside
the component implementation code.
From JPF point of view, every event absorbed by a component is represented
inside the JPF VM as a thread which invokes a given method on a particular
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Fig. 5. Example of the Verification
interface. On the other hand, an emitted event is represented as a thread invoking
a method on an interface of another component.
Considering our example, both checkers are in their initial states at the be-
ginning, there are no threads in JPF VM. Manager therefore asks BPChecker
for a list of events which can be simulated. According to the protocol, an event
?db.start is proposed. This event is then simulated, a new thread which in-
vokes the method start on the interface db is created inside JPF. From now
JPF starts with the verification of the component’s code. This process is moni-
tored by Manager and interrupted whenever the component tries to communicate
with its environment. Here, such situation occurs when the component invokes
lg.log. Manager immediately stops the verification and verifies that the emit-
ted event conforms to a given behavior protocol. Then the thread is interrupted
until the moment when BPChecker proposes a simulation of an event which rep-
resents a response to the invoked call. In between, the verification of parallel
threads inside the JPF state space can continue.
Looking at the behavior protocol in Fig. 5, we can see that an event lg.log
does not have any corresponding method call in the component implementation,
in Fig. 5 indicated by a question mark. During the verification, JPF executes
the method stop, reaches its end and notifies BPChecker. However, the the
protocol specifies that during the stop method execution, an even !lg.log will
be emitted. Since no such event occurred, it is an obvious behavior protocol
violation and an extensive report (including stack traces of both checkers) will
be send to the developer.
11
Except the component’s behavior, which is verified whenever the component
emits an event, the JPF checker itself verifies additional properties, e.g. the
presence of deadlocks, unhandled exceptions or any other user defined properties.
This finally leads to an exhaustive verification of every property along all the
execution paths of the component’s implementation.
5 Evaluation
As the biggest contribution of our work we consider the Environment Simulation
concept that straightforwardly solves the missing environment problem. Contrary
to the COMBAT checker [17] described in Section 6, we do not require any
reductions of behavior protocols; therefore, our approach provides an exhaustive
simulation of the environment and correct verification of components.
To show the quality of our method, we developed a prototype implemen-
tation – Carmen Project [1]. The tool verifies Fractal software components [3]
implemented in Java against their behavior protocols and the sets of user-defined
properties. In this section we present the performance evaluation and discuss the
limitations of our tool.
5.1 Case Studies and Performance Evaluation
For performance evaluation, we used real-life case studies from the Component
Reliability Extensions for Fractal component model (CRE) [6] and CoCoMe [2]
projects.
CRE is an application that manages the airport services for wireless inter-
net connection. It consists of more then twenty components. We have selected
three non-trivial components for verification6: the FlyTicketClassfier component
classifies air tickets and provides connections to the appropriate database, the
ValidityChecker component verifies the airtickets, and the Arbitrator component
controls the whole system.
For the second part of the performance evaluation, we used the Fractal im-
plementation of the Store and CashDeskExample components from the CoCoMe
case study [8], addressing the simulation of cash desk system in a supermarket.
For the performance evaluation, we did several comparison tests between
Carmen and COMBAT, using the code of the components mentioned above.
The following parameters have been monitored: Unique States (number of unique
states that were reached), Visited States (total number of reached states), Time
(total time of the verification), and States/Second (the number of states visited
per second).
The results of the performance evaluation7 are presented in Table 1.
6 More detail information regarding these components, the whole case study, and the
Carmen documentation can be found at the project web page [1].
7 All the tests were run on Pentium 4 3.0 GHz with 2.0 GB RAM, Windows Server
2003 OS.
12
Table 1. Performance Comparisons
Case Component Checker # States Time States/
Study Name Unique Visited Second
CRE FlyTicketClassifier Carmen 922 1 920 3s 640
COMBAT 6 519 10 254 4s 2563
CRE ValidityChecker Carmen 435 592 2s 296
COMBAT 4 033 9 324 4s 2331
CRE Arbitrator Carmen 6 074 14 898 34s 438
COMBAT 166 977 378 437 9m:30s 663
CoCoMe CashDeskApp Carmen 3 480 851 6 644 606 1h:32m:17s 1200
COMBAT 4 839 108 10 541 046 33m:26s 5 254
CoCoMe Store Carmen 574 538 1 717 282 2h:29m:09s 192
COMBAT 11 669 994 28 728 733 1h:49m:08s 4 387
While COMBAT verifies a closed system (including the generated environ-
ment), Carmen simulates the environment during the verification and therefore
the progress of the verification is slower. This can be observed when verifying the
components from the CRE case study — FlyTicketClassifier, ValidityChecker,
and Arbitrator. However, the state space of COMBAT is larger, which is caused
by the necessity to include the generated environment. Thus, the total verifica-
tion time is better for Carmen in all the three cases and the difference between
the total verification times (Carmen vs. COMBAT) is the bigger the larger the
state space is.
As to the verification results for the CoCoMe case study (CashDeskApp,
Store), Carmen again generates considerably smaller state spaces and the veri-
fication times are reasonable. However, the COMBAT tool achieves better total
verification time. We believe that this is caused by the recent progress of the
COMBAT tool which was ported to a newer version of JPF (version 4), whereas
Carmen uses an old one (version 3.3.1). We reflect this finding in our future work
(Sect. 7).
The bottom line is that Carmen is able to verify complex components in a
reasonable time without any reductions of behavior protocols. The confrontation
with COMBAT, which requires additional reductions of behavior protocols, has
revealed that Carmen reaches fully correct verification and comparable perfor-
mance.
5.2 Tool Limitations
Even though our approach potentially achieves exhaustive verification, the real-
life application brings several limitations. Specification of parameters that are
passed to the methods when generating events is the most important burden
to deal with. The range of possible values has to be manually specified and its
extensiveness directly affects the state space size. Therefore, the values should
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be chosen with respect to the component implementation, to allow the checker
to explore maximum of execution paths. The details are out of scope of this
paper, we briefly discuss some of them in Sect. 6.
More detailed evaluation of Carmen and a discussion of its limitations can
be found in [19].
6 Related Work
COMBAT [17] uses, similarly to the approach applied in our work, JPF in co-
operation with BPChecker. It generates a virtual environment that is verified
together with the component (see Section 3.1). For more information about the
environment generation see [16]. However, the significant disadvantage of this
checker lies in the absence of any solution to repetition and alternative opera-
tor problems addressed by Carmen. Instead, behavior protocols are simplified in
order to avoid unsupported forms of protocols. These constraints consequently
lead to a non-exhaustive verification of components. Nevertheless, we demon-
strate the performance comparisons between both the approaches in Section 5.
Also, our approach is related to the assume-guarantee principle in model
checking [13]. The tools based on this principle report the description of all
the environments in which a given model satisfies a given property. We also
use the idea of environment, but in the opposite manner: the description of
the environment behavior (the calls from the environment to the component
described in the behavior protocol) is given by the developer and the tool checks
whether the property is satisfied in the environment. Note that the property
itself is also specified by the behavior protocol (the reaction of the component
to the calls made by the environment).
When searching for an equivalent alternative to Java PathFinder [4], we have
been considering an alternative — Bandera [10]. It is a set of tools and modules
which are designed to verify Java programs. Bandera accepts a complete Java
program as an input and translates it into a language that can be verified by
a specified model checker. Although Bandera is not intended to verify software
components, it decomposes a target program into a part which is verified and
the rest that is represented by specially generated environment. This approach
is very similar to the Environment Generation concept presented in Section 3.1.
Bandera also allows to use value domains for specifications of method parameters
of given classes. However, the recent release of Bandera is an alpha version which
is not fully stable yet.
Finally, we chosen Java PathFinder [4] as the basis of our implementation
since it allows modification of its core implementation and is designed to support
extendability by additional plugins.
In our work, we mainly focus on the verification of the order in which the
methods of the component are called; another big issue is to cope with the values
of the parameters that are passed to the methods. We use very simple heuristic
approach to solve this problem, more sophisticated methods can be found e.g.
in [11] or [14]: under-constrained execution [11] is a special kind of symbolic
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execution, where some of the symbolic values (e.g. those that origin from the
parameter values) are marked as under-constrained. If an error involves an under-
constrained operand, an error message is produced only if the error occurs for
all possible values of the operand (according to its type). This approach reduces
the number of spurious errors. In [14], symbolic execution with lazy initialization
is used to adapt Java PathFinder for verification of open systems: the method
parameters are initialized during the execution in a lazy way; the exact value
domains are not required from the developer.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we present our approach to model checking of software compo-
nents. Our solution verifies software components implemented in the Java lan-
guage against their behavior specifications (behavior protocols [18]) and sets of
user-defined properties. To achieve the goal we designed a system that coordi-
nates two model checking tools: Java PathFinder [4] and BPChecker [15]. Our
solution was implemented as the Carmen tool [1].
Carmen employs on-the-fly simulation of software component environment
to enclose the model representing implementation of an isolated software com-
ponent. We consider this feature as the biggest contribution of our work.
Scalability of our approach was tested on real-life examples and the results
show that our solution provides reasonable performance and brings fully correct
verification.
As a future work we plan to improve performance of our tool by porting it to
the most recent version of Java PathFinder (and thus to fully use its state-of-the
art verification heuristics).
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